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I walk into the room and the smell of burning wood hits me immediately. The warmth 
from the fireplace grows as I step nearer to it. The fire needs to heat the little cottage 
through the night so I add a log to the fire. There are a few sparks and embers. I 
throw a bigger log onto the fire and it drops with a thud. Again, there are barely any 
sparks or embers. The heat and the smell stay the same. They don’t change and I do 
not become habituated to it. Rather, they are just a steady stream, so I take off my 
VR headset and give my recommendations to the team programming the gamified 
world of the virtual museum of the future (one depicting an ancient Turkish 
settlement, being built now at the institution where one of us works). As much as this 
technological world seems almost too futuristic, it actually retrieves obsolete items 
from the past—a heater, a piece of wood, and a spray bottle doing double duty of 
mist and scent—in keeping with McLuhan’s (1973) insights regarding media that 
provide strong participation goals and the rubric for achieving them. Moreover, the 
VR world extends the progression of game AI that occasioned the love-hate 
relationship with the “walking sim.” The stronger the AI, the more clearly defined the 
rubric for participation. In the VR interactive museum the designers want people to be 
able to ‘play’ with haptic devices—like the smell, smoke, and heat generators—in 
order to heighten not only the immersion but also the perception of being there, or 
what Bolter and Grusin (2000) call “immediacy” (p. 5).  
Indeed, Bolter and Grusin argue that the need for immediacy overwhelmingly takes 
over, regardless of the media’s intrusion. However, in the example above, the system 
fell short because the designers had not figured for someone laying down the “log” 
on the virtual fire and having it send a representative—that is, a perceptual, based on 
experience, intuition, etc.—amount of sparks and heat. Someone else could throw 
the log as hard as they want. The machine simply acknowledges 1 or 0; log in or log 
out. 
The computer’s terse manner drives home a foundational concern with the 
ontological and epistemological parameters designed into computation; the fact is, 
the computer is not concerned at all. Machines and AI are based upon a model of 
intelligence which prioritises mental representation and symbolic manipulation: in a 
(or the) word, logos, logic. Conversely, we, following Heidegger’s (2001) famous 
phrase, are Da-Sein (there-being), and we are fundamentally Concerned (or in ‘Care’ 
(Sorge)) (p. 36). It is this ontological feature of Concern/Care that allows us to find 
ourselves in a world (Befindlichkeit): recall that we are ‘in’ the mood, instead of it 
being ‘in’ us. This foundational ability lights up our worlds (the world of academia, the 
world of sport, the world of Ethiopian cuisine) with all kinds of significance depending 
upon our being-there, in a body, in a language, in a mood. We hope for, we doubt 
about, we worry regarding, we fear that, we are overjoyed because, we look forward 
to; we are always in a state of Concern/Care. This feeling about, i.e. being in a mood 
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(Stimmung) leads us to thinking about things in very particular ways. As Ratcliffe 
(2013) outlines: 
Being in some mood or other is […] a fundamental existentiale of Dasein […] it is 
essential to the distinctively human way of having a world […] In the absence of 
mood, we would not find ourselves in a world at all and would therefore cease to 
be Dasein. To find oneself in a world is not, first and foremost, to occupy the 
perspective of an impartial spectator, neutrally gazing upon things from a 
particular space-time location. Rather, the world that we belong to is a significant 
realm, where things can have a host of different practical meanings […] Finding 
oneself in the world is thus a matter of being practically immersed in it rather than 
looking out upon it. (2013, pp. 157-158, emphasis in original) 
Nevertheless the machine continues to converse with us in a gruff manner: if, then, 
else, repeat. It cares nothing for Care.  
For van Lent and Laird (2001), in their field-defining presentation, the “killer app” of 
human-level AI was going to be computer games. Still their reasoning, like the AI, 
was rather unsophisticated in its orientation. Their basic premise is that creating 
games with “realistic human-level characters will lead to fun, challenging games with 
great game play” (p. 16). In fact, they seem to base the premise on the determinism 
that games are fun and that fun games will be successful. For us, this offers a 
reductive view of the complexities of play, of the emotions play generates, and of the 
motivations underlying play. While games have gotten more complex we are not 
certain the positionality of the AI has kept pace in terms of the affective dimension. 
Writing a decade later, Weber, Mateas, and Jhala (2011) are still responding to this 
original position, by way of AI in strategy games, with the goal of “reducing the 
decision[-making] complexity” so that it becomes non-trivial (p. 329). While they 
succeed in reducing things to paths based on isolating gameplay scenarios into 
smaller problems which can be solved and developing an abstraction to perform 
reasoning about goals, both of these remain problematic, the former because they 
are are non-hierarchical and the latter—of greater significance for the current 
project—“because different types of abstractions are necessary” (p. 329). Even so, 
the idea that AI has been confined to problem solving and goal oriented behaviour 
signals an abnegation, as it were, of the affective dimension in favour of instrumental 
rationality. Writing for the most recent IEEE meeting, Petrović (2018) also makes the 
case for human-level AI in games as something with potential, but now he recognizes 
that early theorists may have been overly optimistic. To put it bluntly, he is more 
harsh than we would be in noting that “developing of human-level AI (or ‘strong AI,’ 
as it is often referred) is still a dream, like it was on the very beginnings” (p. 39981). 
While he notes the success of algorithmic adaptations of board games like Go, 
Checkers, Chess, and Reversi (Othello) or card games like Poker, Petrović (2018) 
points out that many of these have finite solutions or nearly finite mathematical 
approximations through series and sequences of numbers. Again, the AI does not so 
much think as provide a series of rapid go/no-go solutions. Moreover, these are the 
games used to calibrate the AI so that the games and their AI are part of a 
tautological circuit. Thus, of particular relevance for our project, Petrović emphasizes 
that unlike “finite, deterministic, constrained gaming spaces, humans (as well as 
other living beings) live and make decisions in a world of uncertainness, with limited 
information available, where infinite numbers of interactions occurs every day. 
Therefore, in order to get closer to human-level intelligence we need more than a 
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gaming board or a deck of cards” (p. 39981). What becomes clear, then, is that as 
much as we have wanted games to offer human behaviours, perception, especially 
with respect to emotions and affective intentionality, has taken a backseat in the 
extant models.  
As phenomenology makes clear, the emphasis on behaviour over perception leaves 
out the crucial, indeed foundational mode of intelligence: affective intentionality. 
Simply put, how we feel about phenomena impacts how we perceive phenomena as 
significant, inconsequential, interesting, etc. Thus, we should be asking if machines 
can even comprehend significance: Can they feel any particular way about a game, a 
move, or the phenomenon of play? Indeed, put plainly, is the phenomenon of play 
even an ontological possibility for the Instruction Set Architectures (ISA) of 
computers? 
 
The Play’s the . . . Thing? 
When mental representation provides the model of intelligence, and vice versa, the 
definition of play becomes paramount. Within the biological sciences, play is 
articulated as an expenditure of excess energy, prominent only in groups meeting 
Maslow’s basic needs (physiological needs such as food and water; safety needs 
such as security from predation) (Sharpe et al., 2002). Further, play has functional 
(i.e., evolutionary) advantages in terms of finding equilibrium within new situations. 
As Sutton-Smith (1997) outlines, “[b]iologically, its function is to reinforce the 
organism’s variability in the face of rigidifications of successful adaptation” (p. 231).  
More than that, these kinds of definitions are epiphenomenal, providing the purposes 
or advantages of play, and therefore do not give us a definition of play in-itself. 
Beyond tracing the commonalities, all of the literature we have surveyed implicitly 
agrees with Gregory Bateson’s foundational discussion of play (1976), wherein he 
ponders the meta-communicative essence of the phenomenon. He somewhat 
mischievously offers “[t]hese actions, in which we now engage, do not denote what 
would be denoted by these actions which these actions denote. The playful nip 
denotes the bite, but it does not denote what would be denoted by the bite” (Bateson 
1976, p. 121). He goes on to explain “(a) that the messages or signals exchanged in 
play are in a certain sense untrue or not meant; and (b) that that which is denoted by 
these signals is non-existent” (Bateson 1976, p. 123). To put this very simply, the 
issue of play pivots around the subjunctive mood, the primordial ‘as-if’: behave as-if 
this nip is in fact a bite; behave as-if this ball crossing a chalk line is winning and 
losing; behave as-if these pixels upon a screen are gods and monsters. The question 
then becomes one of determining how much immediacy is required to get to “as-if” in 
a game and whether the limitation is one of hardware, software, or of the people who 
create and their methods and rationale. Given the tautology above, we are fairly 
certain of the answer. 
This act of meta-communication, substantial of course in all metaphor, analogy, 
simile and so on, comes very naturally to the human. It is innately an act of fantasy, 
or perhaps more strongly illusion, as Huizinga originally pointed out (1949) regarding 
the magic circle: one commits to the illusion of meaning, of an act and its attendant 
scenario, so absolutely that the illusion ceases to be, phenomenologically speaking, 
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and becomes its own truth; to do otherwise is to be a spoilsport that breaks the 
illusion. As Gadamer (2004) pithily acknowledged, “all play is a being-played” 
(p. 106), and the coming together of players, equipment, and rules generates an 
event that has its own ontology, its own truth, exceeding all of the individual 
components; a genuine inter-pretation.This can only occur in and through a given 
gameworld’s (or gamified world’s) ability to instill, simulate, or otherwise produce the 
affective intentionality coterminous with the commitment to the as-if: once I commit, I 
leave a state of apathy and begin to wish, to desire, to want to achieve, succeed, win, 
and so on.   
Similarly, the example from the virtual museum highlights the ongoing omission. 
Human-level AI should not just reproduce a human’s response to inputs, but should 
produce responses that a human would perceive. In short, human-level AI needs to 
perceive play itself. Even so, we must ask, is this possible for the literal 
fundamentalism of the machine? Can a machine that only ever asserts, ponders, and 
rejects in the most prosaic manner comprehend the initial meta-communicative 
gesture, as-if? 
Phenomenology gives us the means and methods to understand the response to 
affective intentionality and, more importantly, to develop the contingent hermeneutic 
(Merleau-Ponty 2013). Let us now consider the production of affective intentionality 
and the ways VR games and gamified systems, like the virtual museum and Red 
Dead Redemption 2 (Rockstar Games 2018) facilitate, impede, and especially teach 
the perception of perception. As a corollary, then, as our article necessarily considers 
meta-communication essential to play, it also considers meta-cognitive processes—
that is, the strategies for learning about learning—that occur in and through 
interaction with AI in games and devices (cf. Hacker 1998, 2016). Indeed, meta-
cognition becomes a contingent component for instilling affective intentionality. 
 
AI and Affective Intentionality 
Developing a successful artificial intelligence engine remains somewhat elusive 
despite its origins in the post-World War II research that eventually produced what 
we now know as the Internet. In fact, this strain of Internet/AI research continues, and 
remains hung up, as it were, on the issue of emotion. For example, Luis-Ferreira and 
Jardim-Gonçalves (2013) explain that while “some information may contain sensorial 
or emotional contents, the search results come essentially from algorithmic execution 
over keywords by relevance” (p. 71). In other words, the affective is subordinate to 
the algorithmic; indeed, it may even be elided by it. Even so, DARPA affiliated 
researchers van Lent and Laird (2001) identified games as the “killer app” that would 
make AI indispensable to the form, and vice versa: “[I]nteractive computer games are 
the killer application for human-level AI. They are the application that will need 
human-level AI” (p. 15). However, as recently as last year, Vladimir Petrović (2018) 
notes that “research on advanced AI agents in the virtual worlds is the necessary 
ingredient of their further evolution; and on the other hand, the virtual worlds 
represent an excellent platform for research on numerous problems related to the 
challenging field of AI” (p. 39976).  
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In fact, Petrović finds a tendency to adopt simple algorithms because a “simple 
illusion of intelligence can have the same effect as a more complex AI” (p. 39978). 
Thus, the development of AI in games has not always been as advanced as it might 
otherwise be. While Petrović attributes this to “expectations and demands coming 
from the virtual reality concept [being] much higher than the technological capabilities 
at that time,” there are other factors at play (p. 39976). Indeed, in their initial 
description of the challenges of implementing AI into video games, van Lent and 
Laird (2001) note that the challenge of actually doing so presents “new research 
problems relating to knowledge representation, agent navigation and human-
computer interaction” (p. 1). However, their work focussed on the responsiveness of 
the agent, the interface, and the enhancement of the pleasures of playing. 
Here, it is worth recalling that the relationship between AI and its use in video games 
has a somewhat problematic history. Van Lent and Laird offer that the design 
principles and AI features from military simulations may have applicability in video 
games. Indeed, they developed combat simulators for the U.S. military prior to 
turning their attention to games. In fact, the first games produced using the fruits of 
their labour were Quake II (id Software 1997) and Descent 3 (Outrage Games 1999). 
These two games, and in particular the AI engine involved, reflect over fifteen years 
of research “in the fields of artificial intelligence and cognitive psychology” (p. 1). As 
much as this is an incredible amount of work, it does not come without consequences 
and limitations deriving from its militaristic roots, not the least of which is an implicit 
basis in hegemonic masculinity.  
This is significant because as Michael Kimmel (1995) explains, the “sturdy oak” 
version of American manhood depends upon and enforces a masculinity that 
“depends on emotional reserve” (p. 498). More specifically, Ramon Hinojosa’s (2010) 
ethnographic work with military personnel finds that such men “construct a 
hegemonically oriented masculinity” based on the assumption that they are “more 
morally oriented, self-disciplined, physically able, emotionally controlled, martially 
skilled, or intelligent than civilians” (p. 179). This becomes a further concern when 
one considers that part of the function of the AI is to interact with the player. 
Therefore, van Lent and Laird (1999) stress the capability of AI engines or agents 
“that include the ability to plan and learn new knowledge” (p. 1). We would highlight 
the fact that whatever the AI agent learns will also be oriented towards what we can 
only characterize as an in-built confirmation bias towards a kind of emotional reserve. 
In fact, we would go further and question whether the ontological and epistemological 
parameters of AI design even allow for a comprehension of affectivity in the first 
instance. Superficial emotional responses such as pleasure or pain, easily 
programmable as 1s or 0s, are markedly different to deeper moods such as anxiety, 
anger, boredom, euphoria, or hope. Indeed, the emotional valence (pleasure or pain) 
is often a metacognitive evaluation of the fundamental mood, i.e., “it is pleasurable to 
feel this kind of anger” versus “this form of anger is painful for me”. Once again, 
metacommunication and metacognition must go hand-in-hand. 
In characterizing the components of the killer app, van Lent and Laird (2001) list 
several qualities of an AI engine for simulating human-level interaction: “real-time 
response, robustness, autonomous intelligent interaction with their environment, 
planning, communication with natural language, commonsense reasoning, creativity, 
and learning” (p. 15). Affect and affective intentionality do not appear. Moreover, our 
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reading of their absence is only furthered by the inclusion of “commonsense 
reasoning.” This is hardly the stuff of an objective or even dispassionate observer. 
There is absolutely no indication whatsoever regarding whose common sense will be 
adopted, on what basis, and with what effects. Simply put, the AI engine will bear the 
trace of its algorithmic origins as an “inference machine and general knowledge 
base” (van Lent and Laird 2001, p. 1). In fact, these are only two of the three parts of 
the AI engine, as van Lent and Laird define it. The other portion is the interface. 
However, they also acknowledge that the knowledge base is the part to which they 
and their programmers—at a ratio of three-to-one—devote most of their attention.     
Thus, the inference machine and the interface, the two parts through which the 
perception occurs, are limited in scope and in attention. Moreover, the goal of the 
project from the outset has been “to make games more enjoyable by making the 
agents in games more intelligent and realistic” (van Lent and Laird 2001, p. 2). We 
would argue that this tautology reveals the need to look further. It speaks to a crucial 
determinism in games, game design, and game studies—both popular and 
academic: a belief that successful games are fun and games that are fun have a 
chance to be successful because fun is a requirement for success. It also equates 
success/fun with realism.  
However, games like Fortnite (Epic Games 2017) and Player Unknown’s 
Battlegrounds (PUBG, PUBG Corporation 2017) call this determinism into question. 
We might argue instead that a generic fidelity or verisimilitude is equally important 
and requires a different set of learning tools. Moreover, pleasure or its counterpart, 
pain, are not particularly subtle or nuanced emotions. Rather they are rather base, 
primary, and easily established. In addition, the emphasis on cognition and cognitive, 
while important in terms of learning, still overlooks the bodily dimension of the 
emotions, their evaluative component, and therefore their intentionality. Here, the 
inference engine might better be described and defined as a metacognition engine 
since the goal should also be to learn about learning and about strategies for 
learning. As Hacker (1998) originally defines it, metacognition includes knowledge of 
the learning processes along with the contingent “ability to consciously and 
deliberately monitor and regulate one’s knowledge, processes, and cognitive and 
affective states” (p. 3).  
The monitoring and regulating functions both map onto affective intentionality in and 
through the evaluative function of emotion. Even if we assume the extent of the 
emotions produced by games is the binary of pleasure and pain, the affect motivates 
or demotivates the player accordingly. In Bennett Helm’s (2009) terms, the felt 
differences between opposing emotions are “a direct result of the specific way these 
emotions evaluate their objects: [e.g.,] to feel fear is to be pained by danger, whereas 
to feel anger is to be pained by an offense and to feel disappointment is to be pained 
by failure. In short, emotions are pleasant or painful precisely in that they are feelings 
of these evaluations impressing themselves on us” (p. 249). There is an awareness, 
then, of the self as well as the measure of things outside the self. In Hacker’s (2016) 
further elaboration of meta-cognition, he establishes “an awareness of oneself as a 
learner” as an important component as well as an important contributor to the 
process of learning strategies for learning (p. 22).  
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Surprisingly, for van Lent and Laird (1999), the successful AI engine has little to no 
evaluative function. Rather, it is a simple, straightforward decision-making process. 
For them, “stimulus-response agents just react to the current situation at each time 
step with no memory of past actions or situations. This type of agent is generally very 
responsive because, without contextual information, the proper reaction to the 
current situation can be calculated very quickly” (p. 3). Even so, they allow that these 
agents cannot easily handle higher-level strategies. Again, the AI engine bears the 
perceptual basis of its militaristic origins. The emphasis is on expediency and on 
instrumental rationality, so that ends are being favoured over means. In the end, it is 
precisely the measure of how we get there, as it were, that forms the basis of our 
investigation.  
 
‘I really mean it, man’: Affective intentionality 
Concurrent with scholars’ turn to video games as the killer app for AI has been a turn 
in the relative standing of emotion as a subject of study. Whereas it had been a 
commonplace to study emotions in terms of the bodily experience that conditions 
and/or accompanies them, it is only recently that scholars have recognized emotions 
as providing measures of cognitive and affective responses to the experiences that 
elicit them in the first instance. As the apostrophe with which this section opens, the 
sentiment includes a pair of qualifiers of its sincerity. The “real” in “really” insists on a 
measure of veracity, whereas the “man” with association with a political stance, 
affirms a measure of humanity along with sincerity.  
The capacity of the affective to become evaluative proves particularly salient when 
studying video games which are inherently systems of measurement and of 
surveillance. As Bennett Helm (2009) observes, “When we turn to the emotions, we 
discover that they have both cognitive, and conative elements insofar as, like 
cognitions, they tell us something about how the world is and, like conations, they 
motivate us to act in various ways to change the world” (p. 248). Nonetheless, the 
correspondence between games and affective intentionality remains until now almost 
entirely outside the realm of game studies scholarship. When we add the perceptual 
bundles through which AI operates, the necessity of studying affective intentionality, 
what Slaby (2008) calls “the mind’s capacity to be directed at something beyond 
itself,” becomes even more pressing (p. 429). As van Ryn, Apperly, and Clemens 
(2019) note, “Individual games cultivate a sense of care in the avatar, both on an 
aesthetic and narrative level through characteristics like cute-ness” (p. 1).  
However, it well worth noting that their main focus is the affective dimension outside 
the game; that is, with regard to the interface and the economy. Still, these represent 
an attachment and an investment beyond just money. The growth of VR 
environments adds still another dimension to any discussion of affective intentionality 
and AI’s role in producing and responding to it. Here it is important to note a 
particularly salient duality in Helm’s enumeration of the evaluative function of 
emotions. He focuses almost exclusively on pleasure and pain, which are, as it 
happens, the two most commonly cited cognitive and affective responses to video 
games. Indeed, this is the very contingency of Jesper Juul’s (2013) famous 
formulation regarding the attraction of video games: “we do not always seek 
pleasure” (p. 41). Indeed, Juul argues that (a) part of the pleasure, as it were, of 
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playing video games comes from the almost certainty of failure. In this way, the game 
becomes a measure of our tolerance for pain, but the pain also becomes a measure 
in and of itself. Put another way, Slaby (2008) argues that it “is in the most central 
cases not a cold, detached, purely cognitive affair, but rather constitutively feelings-
involving. It is affective intentionality” (p. 429). Where Juul posits that the interplay 
and juxtapositions of pleasure and pain constitute the ruling paradox of video games, 
we would argue with Helm and Slaby that these are not paradoxical at all. Rather, 
they index the evaluative constituents of affective intentionality. Thus, affective 
intentionality is not just a product of video game play, or a component of game play, it 
is also something for which the game AI itself must index and evaluate. 
Slaby (2008) lists five dimensions through which affective intentionality operates. Of 
these, one is particularly important to the present project. In emotional experience, 
“we are not consciously focusing on our body, but rather have a bodily feeling 
towards something outside our body – towards a particular threat, an offence, a loss, 
or whatever else there may be that is or might be significant for our wellbeing” 
(p. 437). Here, it is well worth mentioning that Ratcliffe (2005) argues for the ways the 
sense of touch provides an exemplar through which the experience of the “felt body” 
can be understood as a fundamental component of cognitive and affective responses 
to external stimuli (p. 47).  
As the formulation implicitly states, there is a simultaneity of experiences—cognitive 
and affective; that is, thinking and feeling—so that we become aware both of 
something outside the body and of the body’s feeling(s) of it. For Slaby (2008), the 
role of “the body schema in emotional experience can be thought of as an extension 
or (metaphorical) ‘generalization’ of the sense of touch” (p. 437). This becomes 
important when we consider the technological from the perspective of Marshall 
McLuhan (1973), whose famous “the medium is the message” most definitely applies 
in this instance and in others (p. 23). This widely quoted and equally misunderstood 
axiom provides a further basis for understanding the role and function of affective 
intentionality, particularly as it applies to (the adaptation of) AI in games. For 
McLuhan, a medium is not simply a means of conveying information; rather, it is any 
extension of the self. Perhaps the easiest to imagine is the pencil. The pencil is an 
extension of the self which offers a connection to the paper. The message, for 
McLuhan, is not the content but rather the change of scale, pace, or pattern, 
especially with regard to the ability to do work, afforded by the extension (Federman 
2004). In the example of the pencil, the message is the speed with which words can 
be written and transmitted. The pattern changes by virtue of syntax and grammar, not 
to mention lines on a page. Ultimately, though, the content of the written note is 
speech or thought.  
Thus, McLuhan concludes that the content of any medium is always another 
medium. The video game controller, for instance, is the most obvious example of 
such an extension. It extends the self in myriad ways, in particular by affording the 
body a sensory connection with a world that is external to the self but which is also 
entirely internalized by it both in and through the connection. If the message of the 
technology is the change of scale, pace, or pattern, then we can see that the 
controller—the interface, more properly—changes the experience of all three. 
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However, one of the consequences of the extension of the self is what McLuhan calls 
the “auto-amputation” effects of any technology that becomes prosthetic (1973, 
p. 52). The effect of any prosthetic is to replace or to supplement the body but with 
the result that it cannot function otherwise. Those who wear glasses or contacts will 
note the immediate change wrought by the prosthetic but with the cost of peripheral 
vision, close vision, or simply the inability to navigate from the bed to the light switch 
once awoken by a crying child or a ringing telephone. Moreover, the additional 
stimuli—the child or the phone—are not only external to the self (and the body), they 
also provide an illustration of the numbing or the narcosis brought on by media 
saturation to which McLuhan refers. Still, in every case, and in particular the game 
controller or the game interface, the contact remains mediated. As we have argued 
elsewhere (Conway and Ouellette 2019), it is incredibly important in the 
contemporary video chat world to remember that when we hold a Google Hangout, a 
Webex, Zoom, FaceTime or Skype conversation, we are not talking to another 
person. We are talking to a device. This is not just an egocentric error of the sort 
which Lacan describes in the “mirror stage.” Instead, it is an example of the illusory 
experience produced by the transparency and the immersion of the medium. Not 
noticing the mediation is another of the auto-amputation effects and it is a significant 
one in terms of the affective intentionality of the AI game (and the game AI) and its 
perception of perception.  
Here, Rob Gallagher (2017) adds an important insight about the “bathetic” effects of 
the current AI engines, particularly in adventure-horror games which succeed by 
“making a virtue of videogame AI’s limitations, they draw players into close 
relationships with NPCs only to expose them to moments of breakdown which 
generate feelings of horror, shock and bathetic absurdity, reminding the player of 
their tendency to slip into states of abstraction more characteristic of an automaton 
than a deep, rational human subject” (p. 120). Further, this seeming success occurs 
precisely because of a system that favours cognitive—that is, linguistic and 
discursive—means over affective ones. In such circumstances, the player will never 
be responding precisely to the game itself; rather one will be responding to the 
mediation of the interface. Gallagher (2017) cites the sudden appearance of seeming 
intuition and its even more sudden disappearance as hallmarks not just of games like 
Silent Hill (Team Silent 1999), but of the AI engines, in general. The bodily 
component of the affective intentionality then becomes more important because its 
precision increases exponentially as the immersion, the reality, but also the 
responses become more developed, involved, and broadly based. Games now 
animate skin blemishes, animal fur, mist or fog, and dust in sunlight without any 
problem at all. They more than adequately offer point-of-view, field of vision, and 
response time. Anyone who has had to calibrate a game screen, whether for Rock 
Band’s (Harmonix 2007) notorious drumkit or the clutch mechanism in the Forza 
games, will immediately recognize that there is still an intuitive feel for these, one that 
is both sense of space and of timing. The question remains as to the AI’s capabilities 
or intentionality to capture or to transmit the affective intentions of the player or 
reasonably represent them in and through the avatar.  
If we were to offer an analogy from the world of art it would be the very necessary 
bodily experience—whether acknowledged as such or not—of attempting to find the 
moment, by moving forward and back, by focussing and refocussing, when a painting 
like Monet’s Bassin d’Argenteuil stops looking like a bunch of smudges and dots and 
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begins to look like sailboats on the Seine. Not only is the body implicated in the 
process, it is part of the process. The “a-ha” moment—to quote Lara Croft’s famous 
interjection from the moment of discovery of a treasure in the original Tomb Raider 
(Core Design 1996), a puzzle solution, a clue, etc.—provides both a cognitive and an 
affective response, one which has both mental map and corporeal kernel. While 
Lara’s reaction might be visceral, to the player, seemingly to the avatar, or to both, 
the reaction remains largely univocal and univalent; hence its status as an internet 
meme and the subject of innumerable gifs, both still and moving.  
At the same time, there needs to be a discernible difference between the response of 
the player and that of the avatar. On the screen, Lara’s moment of “a-ha” represents 
a cognitive response, one of awareness, of discovery, etc. In contrast, the reaction of 
a player may well be one of absolute relief, complete with fallen shoulders and 
perhaps even a drop of the controller and a different interjection: “Finally!” In fact, the 
reaction might well be one of abject indifference to the game at that point. This 
invokes another of Slaby’s (2009) contentions regarding affective intentionality, 
namely the relationship of emotional pleasure and pain to a bodily experience of 
those emotions. This follows from Bennett Helm’s (2009) argument that emotions 
represent and reflect an “evaluative intentionality” (p. 248). The overwhelming 
tendency of the AI, however, is to insist on celebratory moments that might be 
completely and utterly out of place given the actual moment for the player. Thus, the 
AI needs to perceive perception itself and the response cannot be a cognitive one 
alone.  
Returning to the example of the “a-ha” moment in Tomb Raider (1996) or to the 
feeling of warmth from the VR wood stove, either of these can be understood as what 
Helm calls “the direct result of the specific way these emotions evaluate their objects” 
(p. 249). These are not just automatic or intrinsically good or bad sensations and 
experiences. Rather, they are constitutive of an evaluation—more specifically an 
indexing—of those sensations and experiences. It is possible to be too warm or not 
warm enough. Thus, there is also an anticipatory component embedded within that 
moment but this too precedes and conditions another set of evaluative emotions, for 
disappointment and fulfilment follow from that moment just as surely as another 
puzzle to solve or another task to complete. Taken together, these cognitive and 
affective responses produce a fourth and potentially most significant result: 
“Emotions in many cases motivate us to act, albeit in various ways” (p. 249). In fact, 
video games rely on this very process in and through the interplay of recreation, rules 
and rewards and the algorithmic kernel through which this occurs. 
As Ruggill and McAllister (2011) explain, games are an insistent technology. This is 
another way of saying games motivate players. However, they do so through three 
related basic elemental functions: discovery, collection, and construction. No game 
better exemplifies these fundamentals more clearly than Minecraft (Mojang 2009). 
Still, there are also meta-game experiences which become part of the overall 
experience of the gameworld. As Hamari and Eranti (2011) explain, metagaming 
aspects and routines occur in and through two primary means. First, players may 
develop rituals, activities, games, and rewards of their own devise. Second, players 
may seek rewards—usually in the form of achievements or game points—that are 
external to the game itself. In fact, they find that the latter features “have been one of 
the most commonly implemented game design patterns in gamification” (p. 2). 
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Ultimately, they argue that these should be counted as games in their own right. 
Indeed, as Cole (2010) and Jensen (2013) agree, players find in-built achievements 
are less rewarding than metagames of their own invention. Even so, within their 
ethnographic research, Hamari and Eranti find that “not all players engage in the 
achievement-hunting meta-game and thus might not regard the progression in the 
achievement system itself as a reward, however, unlocking an achievement takes the 
player closer to the (usually implicit) winning condition of an achievement system—
unlocking the maximum amount of badges” (p. 11). At this moment, the game 
features what Rolf Nohr (2015) argues is one of the hallmarks of a “meta-game” 
insofar as it provides its own means of evaluation (p. 201). Simply put, players’ 
reactions to the rewards, both in-game and out-of-game, index the level of their 
motivation but also their relative embrace or aversion to grief, frustration, desire, 
satisfaction, worry, and anticipation, among other evaluative emotions.  
For example, Forza Horizon 4 (Playground Games 2018) suggests a change in the 
skill level of the AI opponents, or “drivetars,” depending on the relative success of the 
player at the current level. The game will recommend a step down in opponent 
quality if the player loses too frequently or too easily, but will also offer the 
enticement of the greater rewards that come with more challenging AI opponents if 
the player wins too handily. The significance lies in that the game AI is starting to 
offer the indexicality of affective intentionality. The suggestion of more difficult 
opponents does not appear if the player barely wins or places in the top three every 
time. Frequent losses become frustrating but also become a disincentive to playing. 
The games become work. However, winning too easily also becomes a disincentive 
to play because it can produce tedium or boredom with the game. Not only is the 
game producing affective intentionality, it is beginning to perceive and measure the 
cognitive and affective responses of the players and rewarding them for skill and 
achievement. In short, the AI is starting to perceive players’ perceptions of the game 
and their evaluative functions. Moreover, the AI itself is measuring, or attempting to 
measure, all of these perceptions and to learn from them. 
 
I Feel for You: Conclusions 
Affective intentionality always already entails an indexicality that should lend itself not 
only to AI and to games (design) but to computing, as well. Computers are nothing if 
not machines for measuring things. Thus, one of the things that strikes us in reading 
through our paper and considering the importance of developing an AI engine for 
affective intentionality is that there should not, then, be a conflict with regimes based 
on instrumental rationality or efficiency. Simply put, we are not asking a computer to 
do anything it cannot already accomplish. The computational labour is already 
accounted for within the language of computing. The impetus must come elsewhere 
for it should not necessarily be the case that the killer app for AI is tech support and 
robo calls. Nevertheless, as recently as one month before the drafting of these 
conclusions, Kshirsagar et al. (2019), write that Checkers, Chess, Go, and 
Backgammon all serve as benchmarks for AI algorithms, that “the structure of these 
games was used to illustrate the learning, reasoning, and planning capacities of the 
algorithm, and was not focused on the human’s effort and attitudes in these 
competitions” (p. 1). The significance lies in the focus of their study and especially in 
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their findings, for theirs was the first experiment to measure people’s reactions to 
competing with robots for a monetary reward. The most significant finding of their 
games-based approach was that they could not explain the failure of their hypothesis 
that people would exert more effort for greater monetary rewards. Kshirsagar et al. 
(2019), theorize that “people would have to be willing to exert effort competing with 
the robot mostly for non-monetary reasons. Ex-ante, we did not expect such 
behavior” (p. 8). What they find instead is the value people place on attachments. 
However, these can actually be measured. Again, the heart of affective intentionality 
is its indexicality. 
Here, we feel it is important to end with an anecdote about the adaptation of gamified 
means to the very affective arena of parenting. For example, given an eleven-year-
old who had missed several deadlines for school assignments because she was 
focussed instead on extra-curricular activities, the parental response might be to 
punish via grounding, ending the extra-curriculars, etc. In a resource management 
game, the contra-ludic effect might be to take away resources or add an obstacle or 
put a time limit on something. Again, these are rather straightforward punishments or 
contra-ludic effects. However, anger and frustration are also indexical. They are 
measurable and so was the solution, which was based on the mood of the situation 
and the intended outcome. If learning, resource management, and strategies for 
learning are the goal of the game—indeed, one of the goals of any game is to teach 
players to play so that they want to play—it should also include the option to make 
the child choose which activity would be removed if something needs to be removed 
at all. In other words, as in the scenario that opened our paper, the importance lies in 
producing and measuring the attachment and the participation goals as well as the 
outcomes. In the scenario just given, the parent chooses the option that would have 
the most suitable emotional impact upon the child, rather than a rational or 
instrumentalist deduction following the recommended ruleset. For example, a child 
disobeys a rule. Regardless of how and why the child disobeyed, the computer 
responds the exact same way each time: 1 or 0. In fact, the choice is made by 
working backward from the goal instead of being goal-oriented. Meanwhile, using a 
human understanding of care, concern, and mood, the response is almost infinitely 
adjustable. The child has broken a rule, but an ontological disposition, being attuned 
to the situation (Heidegger (2001) calls this mood attunement “Stimmung,” a term 
which has the same musical connotation as attune), lets a parent respond very 
differently to rule-breaking (p. 172). 
In other words, computers have no sense of attunement; indeed, they cannot “find 
the tune” at all. It is simply not part of their existing ontology. Here, we say existing, 
because we know that computers can and are capable of measuring and mapping 
tunes. Here again, we point to the source and not the substance of the relevant AI: 
Auto-Tune was created to help Exxon Mobile find oil and gas deposits, not to help 
singers and song-writers. Computers can measure, but as we mentioned earlier, the 
content of a medium is always another medium. Thus, the content of the extant AI 
routines will always already be corporate, militaristic, and instrumental. Asking a 
computer “what is closest to you?” would evince a response of either A) the closest 
material space/object or, if programmed a bit cunningly, B) a person the computer 
was programmed to acknowledge. Regardless, the computer could never 
dynamically shift its sense of significance as we can, picking up on the “mood of the 
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room” to, say, “my partner’s voice,” or “my friend’s face,” or “that painting,” or “my cup 
of coffee,” etc. 
Simply put, the computer has no capacity for ‘world,’ in the phenomenological sense. 
The human finds itself always already as being-in-the-world, whether that is the world 
of scuba diving, the world of finance, or the gameworld. These worlds are founded 
upon affect, as Crowell (2005) discusses:   
[I]t is through moods that things matter to us […] Heidegger links affectivity to the 
pre-intentional disclosure of being-in- the-world as a whole. Less formally, it is 
through mood that the world as a whole – the context of significance co-
structured by my projects – is opened up as mattering in a certain way. When I 
am bored it is the world as a whole that is boring, hence individual things in it can 
strike me as tedious; when I am joyous I am warmly attuned to things as a whole, 
hence I can find particular things enchanting. At the same time, moods tell me 
something about myself. […] Moods thus attest that I am not a pure egological 
spontaneity but am passively exposed to the world. (p. 58) 
Whilst our ontology provides an innate exposure to worlds (through moods, feelings, 
emotions), the computer has no such capacity, it is intrinsically worldless: whilst we 
are ontological, the computer is ontic. It follows then, that whilst the computer can be 
a part of many worlds, much like a desk, a chair, or a monitor, it remains numb to any 
specific world’s significance. It cannot play, since play depends firstly upon 
recognition of the significance of a world.  
For its part, the machine can do things quickly and is very good at that, but of course 
none of those can be stretched, they can only be compressed. This is why games 
like Resident Evil 7 (Capcom 2017) or Grand Theft Auto IV (Rockstar North 2008) or 
Skyrim (Bethesda 2011) insist the player make the (very simple) “moral choice” (save 
your spouse, help a homeless girl, sacrifice an associate, respectively) while games 
like Call of Duty: Modern Warfare 2 (Infinity Ward 2009) or Black Ops II (Treyarch 
2012) give you no choice other than to not play. Instead of having to make a choice 
based on an index of affective intentionality, the game leaves it to the player, leaves 
the player hanging (the infamous dilemma of Missile Command (Atari 1980), whether 
to save missile bases or cities) or makes you choose not to play. In contrast, a 
human plays and feels the beauty of a move, the angst of a missed opportunity, the 
anxiety of the clock ticking down. The computer game simply says: 1 / 0. Here, we 
also think of the rise of football manager and other sports simulators and especially 
their influence and impact on the real sports (Ouellette and Conway 2018). It is very 
easy to be a football manager when all you have are players reduced to stats. It 
should be recognized immediately that reducing people to stats has a limited utility 
and leads to the fan thinking he or she really could be a football manager. In contrast 
the coach/manager has all manner of information on which to draw and which might 
actually be quantified—fatigue, aches, etc.—but not easily. The most obvious 
example is a hockey fight, something that requires a game engine from a combat 
game to be ported to what was otherwise a sports simulation in order to produce the 
immersion, the immediacy of being there for the player.  
Yet actual hockey fights are not often spur of the moment things and even if they are, 
there’s a negotiation that games do not take into account. It is not some erotic or 
orgasmic building of tension (male egoism qua jouissance writ large and gameified, 
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again). It is a tease, one that hockey players literally call “dancing.” Indeed, in Feb. 
2019, the sports website Barstool Sports (Jordie, 19 Feb.) posted a video of players 
squaring off as if ready to fight but then breaking into a dance routine, just in time for 
Valentine’s Day. The video is six years old and the event was actually from a charity 
game. However, this was not initially known to fans or to the bots on social media 
sites like FaceBook, Twitter, etc. What ensued was the sort of kneejerk homophobic 
reactions one might expect as the video became instantly viral—that is, until the gaps 
in understanding have been filled. Then, the reactions change. This is the very 
contingency of McLuhan’s distinction between hot and cool media, one that we think 
is not only the key to any future AI engine, it is also the key to any future game 
design heuristic, for such a heuristic will recognize the ways that games are hot 
media that become cool and vice versa. Instead of the military-industrial model on 
which the current game system, the AI system, and the games used to calibrate the 
AI are based, we would call, as we elaborate in detail elsewhere (Conway and 
Ouellette 2019), for a design heuristic that can account for affective intentionality. 
This is especially important at the moments when the reception of the media 
reverses—for example, from low participation to high and back again—for these are 
the instances when emotions are most likely to shift to more aroused states: 
happiness, frustration, anger, etc., or satisfaction, anticipation, boredom, etc. The 
computing power certainly exists, but until now it has only ever been focussed on 
measuring absolute rather than scalable outcomes. Moreover, the tautology that 
successful games being fun games because fun games are successful belies the 
maturity of the medium and the complexity of players’ responses, each of which can 
and should be measured or at least anticipated. The AI needs its own AI. 
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